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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent,

vs.
RALPH CHILD CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACT
On or about August, 1958, Mr. Laron Kunz, an audirtmof the Utah State Tax Commission, made an audit of the
books of the Ralph Child Construction Oompany (Tr. 47).
Mr. Child testified fuat it was his understanding that rtJhe
audit was being made of tlle books and records of Southeast Service, but that rthe auditor, oOIIltrary to pernllssio.n,
explored his office files and made a report which is the
basis of this lawsuit (Tr. 37). In any event, as a resulrt of
this audit the Utah State Tax Oommission found $3,608.00
to •be due and payable for sales and use taxes and filed a
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2

warrant for delinquent sales and use taxes a~ Mr.
Ohild's property. This warrant was dated February 16,
1959. Mr. Child, on February 18, 1959, filed a petition
with the Utah State Tax Commission to review the assess·ment. On or aboult April 6, 1959, a !hearing was had and
evidence taken peDtaining to the alleged deficiencies, Whic!h
hearing was oonrtinued to Mavch· 22, 1960, for the further
taking of testimony. The principal items of dispute arose
out of a job fue taxpayer had for the Emery County Unioo
Telephone Associartion, Inc., under a contract dated May
23, 1952.
This job involved the complete construction of a tele-

phone system in Emery County under the dirootioo of the
RE.A. The conrbract price, lump sum was $107,632.21 (See
Taxpayer's Ex. 2) (Tr. 14). There were admtions made
to the oonrtr<mt and it was later increased in amount.
fu connection with this job the taxJpayer (oontaotor)
poochased telephone poles from SourtJham & Sons, Spanish
Fovk, UtJah, and telephone equipment manufantured by Kellog SiWitehboord and Supply Company of Chicago. Sales
by Kellogg were solicited by Kellogg in Utah through their
sales :represrortartive.

The auditor ~ound that during fue year 1952 MT. Child
puoohased from Southam & Sons $25,231.03 wo:rth of telephone poles and that these telephone poles were purchased
for "resale." A:s evidence of this, the Tax Commissioo. furnished 01ne invoice f.ro:m Southam & Sons marked "for :r&
sale", which is State's Exhibit No. 1 (See Tr. 59-60). The
ta~payer supplied the Tax Commission wirtJh purohase ordeTs fur all of these pooes and for the placing of 1he same
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in the holes, which are shown as Taxpayer's Exhibit 11, and
which generally contain the following notations:
"To: Southam & Sons
Address: Spanish Fork, Utah
Shipped To: Ralph Child
Address: Emery Oounty, Uta!h.
All poles to be gained, drilled and to have all inspection
fees and taxes paid tllereon. Shipped by seller's choice,
fo. b. job, if by truck, freight prepaid, teml:S same as
general contl"act with R.E.A.",
or in the alternative, the purchase orders contained this
language:
"taxes paid by seller."
In ·spite of 'the seller's pu:rchaJse orders, the ':Dax Commission found on the basis of the one invoioo from Southam
& Sons that Mr. Ohild purchased these poles fm- "resale."
There was no testimony on this rubject other than that of
Mr. Child. This one invoice is the Commission's only evidence.

The Tax Commission through this audit fionnd 1Jh~t Mr.
Child had purchased $49,945.33 wooth of telephone equipment from Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Company, but
that Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Company was not a
"residenrt" of the State of Utah and tJhat, ifJh&efore, tlhe pur.;
chaser had to collect and pay 1Jhe sales tax. This they found
in spite of their own finding (Finding of Fact 8b) fuat the
equipment was sold to the taxpayer, f.o.b., Price, Utah, and
the evidence was that the rtransaction was made and completed by the seller's ~agent, one H. E. Mundy, as a result of
solicitation of business from t!he taxpayer in Utah. The
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evidence shows 1:Jbat the transaction was made in the Mission Motel in Price, UtaJh, at the behest O!f H. E. Mundy,
agent for Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Company (See
Tr. 89).
'I1he other items of dispute were items purchased out
of state by the taJq>ayer !fior use wirthin 1his state. The Com-

mission found (Finding of Fact 8c) that these items amounted to $188,177.02.
Mr. Ohild's contentions are set :fort!h in his Schedules
which are set foth in the Appendix to this Brief.
Schedule A sets forfu t!he material purchased for use
oot of the State and wm~h were used out of the Srtate. This
schedule has been amended to co.rrect errors made in his
original :filing.
Schedule B is a summary of material purehased for ultimate OOillSumption and, tJherefore, exempt ·from sales tax.
Schedule C consists of material pwohased out of State
for use wi1Jhin the Sta:te, which the truqmyer concedes tax
mbility.
Schedule D is a summary of material PlNX'hased in
Price, Utah, fr.om the Kellogg Switchiboaro and Supply Oompany.
Many of the taxpayer's records are incomplete or unawrilable. His schedules have been prepared from such infiormation rthaJ1: remains available. IDs business pmctice
requires the elimination of recm-ds more fuan six years old
and, therefore, he ·is at a distinct disadvantage requiring
1:Jo defend this type of a proceeding at this date. The taxpayer has done six or seven million dollars in business since
rtihe date of the oomplained of transactioo (Tr. 101).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT 1
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMiMISSION AUDITORS
ERRED IN ASSESSING SALES TAX, INTEREST AND
PENALTIES ON THE PURCHlASE OF TELEPHONE
POLES FROM LEE SOUTHAM & SONS. (Schedule B,
Appendix)
POINT 2
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSlON AUDITORS
ERRED IN ASSESSING USE TAX, IINTEREST, AND
PENALTIES ON THE PURCHASE OF TELEPHONE
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPlVIENT FROM THE KELLOGG
SWITCHBOARD AND SUPPLY COMPANY (Schedule
D, Appendix)
POINT 3
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION AUDITORS
ERRED IN ASSESSING SALES OR USE TAX ON PROPERTY PURCHASED OUT OF STATE FOR USE OUT OF
STATE, SAID ITEMS BEING EXEMPT. (Schedule A,
Appendix)
POINT 4
THE UTAH STATE TAX COlVIMISSlON AUDrTORS
ERRED IN ASSESSING SALES OR USE TAX ON PROPERTY PURCHASED OUT OF STATE, INTENDED FOR
USE IN THE STATE, NOT USED IN THE STATE, BUT
LATER SOLD OUT OF STATE IN ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES, SAID SALES BEING EXEMPT.
(Schedule C, Appendix)
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POINT 5

THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN
ASSESSING PENALTIES AND INTEREST IN ANY
EVENT FOR THERE IS NO PRIMARY OBLIGATION
ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO PAY THE
ALLEJGEiD USE TAX AND NO SHJOWING OF WILFULLNESS IN NOT PAYING, OR KNOWLEDGE ON
PART OF APPELLANT THAT TAX WAS 'DUE.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1

THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION AlDITORS
ERRED IN ASSESSING SALES TAX, INTEREST AND
PENALTIES ON THE PURCHASE OF TELEPHONE
POLES FROM LEE SOUTHAM & SONS. (Schedule B,
Appendix)
In order to understand appellant's position irt is necessary to understand the defin1tions set forth in Utah Code

Annotated 5-9-15-2.

The defuitions applllicable are as fol-

lows:
" (e). The term "retailer" means a person doing a
regularly o~ga.nized retail business in tangible personal
property, known to the public as wch and selling to
the user oc oonsumer and not for resale, and includes
commission merchants and all persons regularly engaged m :the business of selling to users or consumers
within the state o[ Utah; * * * *. The term "retail
sales" means every sale within 1Jhe state of Utah by

a retailer or wholesaler to a usm- or oonsumer, except
suCh sales as are defiined as wholesale sales or o1JherWiise exempted by tthe terms O!f this act; but the term
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"retail sale" is not inrtended to include isolated nor occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in business • • • • ."
'' (c) . The term ''Wholesaler'' means a person doing
a regularly organized wholesale or jobbing business and
known to the trade as such and selling to retail merchants, jobbers, dealers or other who!lesalers, fur the
purpose of resale."
It is obvious from the above definitions that Mr. Child
is neither a who~esaler or a re1Ja11er. It would appear, therefore, that his status in the transaction conce:rning the telephone poles must be rtJhat of an ulrtimaJte consumer. If thaJt
is true, then the tax should have been oollected by the seller
from the sale of these poles to the ultimate consumer. The
board will recall ~that the evidence is undispUJted that these
poles went into oonstruoti.orn, under a unit contract for installation, of a telephooe system for the Emery County
F8JI'Illers Union Telephone .Assooiatiorn, Inc. They did not
purohase the poles individually and rtJhere is no evidence
offered by the state that they did. Under 1Jhe cmcumstances
the appellant fits wi1:Jhin :the mtegory of a contractor as defined in the Utah Concrete Products Corporation case. In
that case the cOUT!t concluded tlhat oonstraotors are cornsumers within the meaning of our .A!ct because they are the
last persons in the chain to deal wirth such products before
incorporation into a separate entity and before such products lose their identity as such. See U1Jah Concrete Products Corporatiorn v. State Tax Oonunission, 101 Utah 513,
125 P.2d 408. The court there concluded specifically that
sales of products made by manufacturer of building materials to contractor for use upon a private construction contract are ta.mble.
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Now that we have concluded that the sale is one involving a sales rtax and one in which the appellant is the ultimate
consumer, it is appropriate that we determine whose responsibility it is 1Jo colleot the tax. This matter is covered conclusively by Utah Code Annotated 59-15-5, 1Jhe substance
of which as it applies to this case ,jg as follows:
"Any person receiving any payment or consideration
upon a sale of property or service rubject to the tax
rmder 1fue provisions of this act, or to whom such payment or consideration is payable hereinafter called the
vendor) shall be responsible for the collection O!f fue
amount of fue tax :imposed on said sale. The vendor
shall ooUect the tax from the verndee, burt in no case
shall he collect as tax an amounJt (without regard to
fractional parts of one cent) m eoocess of the tax compurted at the raJtes p:resoribed in tlrls act, provided,

....

"

You will note by a oomplete reading of this statute
thalt there is repeaJted mference to the "vendor". In no instance does tJhis sootion make the responsiJbility for collection of the tax and payment of the 1Jax assessable to the
purchaser or ultimate consumer. Nor does 1hls transaction stilt within lbhe aJocepted category of a sale to a retailer
for resale, for the state has offered absolutely no evidence
to the effect that the ultimate consumer represented to the
~er tJhaJt the pe~sonal property purchased was for :re-~e. Withourt a showilng of good and substantial evidenre
of this iiaot this one exception to the provision above cited
cannot be used by :the state as an excuse for assessing a
sales tax against rthe appeHant in rthis instance.
It would appear C0111clusively that the tax assessed in
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tlhis instance is erroneous and should, without doubt, be
eliminated.
POINT 2
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION AUDITORS
ERRED IN ASSESSING US\E TAX, TINTEREST, AND

PENALTIES ON THE PURCHASE OF TELEPHONE
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE KELLOGG
SWITCHBOARD AND SUPPLY COMPANY (Schedule
D, Appendix)
A general rational set forth m answer to Point 1 is
a.ppliicable to the question in Pomt 2. It is the oonrtentio!n.
af the appellant that 1:/he sale made 1Jo the appell.am; by Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Company was a domestic sale
made within tile state of Utah and subject to sales tfJax~
There is absolutely no evidence to the elffoot that the sale
of tJhis merchandise took place anywhere but Wi1Jhln tile
starte of UrtJaJh and the only testimony introduced iby 'any
person at tllis hearing was thart introduced by the appellant to the effect that the sale was transacted in the Mission
Motel at Price, UrtaJh, fur the purchase of all electronic
supplies required by fue plans and specifications furnished
to the appellant for the construction of the telephone system· for the Emery County Farmers Union Telepho.n:e Association, Inc. This being undisputed ~t would seem t1ha!t
there is no evidence upon which the Tax Oommisslion could,
under any circumstance, OOIIl!clude that 1Jhis was a purchase
made outside of the state of Utah.
The terms of this purchase were for tJhe sale in bulk
of the items necessary to complete this contract and it was
initiated, entered into and consummated in the State of
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Utah. . ,The. rerorrd is devoid .of any evidence tJhat this is
not a domestic sale. Under the circumstances the law applicable woruld seem to be the law applimble nnder Point 1
and this, therefore, being a sales tax, it would seem 1Jo be
incumbent upon the srtJate of Utah to assess the tax to the
retailer and collect it from him. These matters have been
the subject of many disputes but four cases which are in
point and which substantiate the position of he appellant
axe as follows:
1. Whitraorre Oxygen Oompany vs. Utah Starte Tax
Commission, 196 P.2d 976:
This was an original proceeding by the Whitmore Oxygen Company against 1Jhe Utah State Tax CommissiorL The
question involved was whether the sale was rubject to sales
tax iin. Irndiana or whether subject to use tax in Utah. The
fact is that Whitmore Oxygen Company ha.d entered into
a oontmct WirtJh Unde Air Products Company, an Ohio corporation whose planJt was located in Speedway, Indiana,
whereby the plaintiff agreed to buy, and the Linde Company agreed rto sell, 1,600 acetylene cylinders for the sum
of $34,000.00 f.o.b. factory, Speedway, Indiana. The contract was a title retain!ing conJtraot and the lender retained
title until such time as all of the installmen!t:s were paid
It is rtJhe contention of the plaintiff thart the sale was consummated m Utah and is, therefore, rubjoot to sales tax
and that the IOOilecti.on of this tax is barred by the statute
of l1mirtaitions, inasmuch as 1Jhe plaintiff had filed regularly
its annual :income rtax returns and had paid tax accordingly.

The State Tax Commission claimed that the sale was made
in Indiana, rtbat no Utah tax return had been filed, and that
the p:roductls were used in Urta:h and subject to use tax.
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HELD:

The question of whe1Jher the sale was consummated
was decided primarily on the f.o.b. provision. The court
said that the f.o.b. provision made the contract complete
in Indiana. The language Oif the court is as fiollows:
11

The necessary implication of an f.o.b. contract is that
the buyer shall bear all expense and bear all risk of
loss after ~the goods are delivered free on board, and
there is a presumption that the property in the goods
passes when the goods have been so delivered, and that
the place where the goods are to be delivered f.o.b.
shall be ~the place of delivery to the buyeT. See Williston on Sales, 2d EJd., Section 280(b). Under this view,
when the ~cylinders were delivered free on board at
Speedway, Indiana, the property in the goods passed
and the sale was complete. * * * We conclude thaJt
for tax purposes the sale orf cylinders was consummated
in Indiana.''
2. Another case which is persuasive is that of Department of Revenue v. Jen:rrison-Wrighrt Corpwation, 66
N.E. 2d 395:
FAC'fS:

This is a complicated fact situation inasmuch as it involves 1lhTee separate cases, however, all of the oases reach
the same conclusion based upon primarily the same substantive facts. In general, the problem was this: That
an Ohio corporation which qualified rto do busiltless in the
State of Illinois sold railroad ties to an illinois corporation.
The ties were produced by tlhe Ohio company's plant in
Alabama and were inspected and improved and accepted
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by the railroad company in Alabama. In Alaibarna tlle ties
ha.d been cut and seasoned and accepted by the railroad
company, but the Ohio company had dipped :them in creosote in lllinois. One of the cases was distinguished to this
extent, 1Jhat the ties whlch were sold were completely finished, including creosorting and were stooked in tlhe com~
pany's warehouse in Missouri. All of the ties .contracted
for were sold f.o.b. East Srt. Louis, Illinois.
Was this a transaction subject to use tax or was the
contract subject to sales tax and if so, who was responsi!ble
for the tax.
HELD:
The court concluded. ,tJhart it was a sale consummated
and concluded in the State of Illinois and fuart it was subject to sales rtax in the State o[ Illinois. The appellant's
contention that while it held the ties in lllinois, it did so
only as a bailee, was disposed of on the basis of where 1he
delivery took place. The court said:

''The facts in this. case are in coofliot with any theocy
that the railroad ,company purchased the timbers from
the producer. Appellants made the contract with the
producer whe,reby the latter was to load the timbers
on cars at point of origin. They were sold f.o.b. cars
at point olf origin consigned to appellants, and rtJh.ey in
turn paid the producer the contract price. The general
rule is tha.Jt the delivecy of personal property by- the
seller to a common oarrieT to be conveyed to rthe purcltaser is a delivery to :tlhe purdhaser and that the title
to the propetzy vesrts in the purehaser limmediately
upon its delivery to rthe carrieT.
The fact that the railroad ilnspected the timbers at
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point of origin and later transported them to this state
without charge to appellant, would not, in view of all
the cirCUlllStances, show that the parties intended that
the title to the property Should pass from the producer
to the railroad oompany. The construction of a contract is to ascertain the intention of the parties, and
there is no more convincing evidence of what the parties intended than to see what they did in carrying oUlt
its provisions. The title to the timbers passed from
the producer to appellants and remained there until
appellants completed the treatment process and delivered tlhem f.o.b. cars, mast St. Louis, Illinois. The
transareti:on was a sale and nort a bailmenrt. ''
3. In addition to 'the above 'Oirtation, the following case
is of interest for it ,1Jouohes on the subject matter in issue
here:
American Bridge Oompany v. Forrest Smith, 157 A.
L.R. 798, 352 Mo. 616, 179 SW(2d) 12:
FACTS:

This was an action

~or

declaratory judgment to determine ,fue taxabiHJt:y of certain sales under provisions of the
Missouri Sales Tax Law. The plaintiff was a ~cooporation
organized under the laws of the state ,of New Jersey with
its principal place of business at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
It was engaged in fabricating structural steel at varioll.lS
places in the state of Mi'Ssouri and it sold the products to
customers in and outside the state of Missouri. The suit
was for declaratory judgment testing the constitutionality
of the Sales Tax Law as am interference with ~commerce.
The Court, in discussing the problem, stated this:
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HELD:
''The transfer of the ownership of, or title to, the property are presumed to have taken place where the possession of the products was delivered to the vendees'
there is no evidence that the plaintiff and the pur-

chasers had a contrary intention. And in these instances, where the title was presumptively transferred
to the purohasers in a foreign state (delivery f.o.b.
cars at p~aintiff's plants in other states" it would seem
beyond question that such sales may not be taxed (basically) under :the provisio!llS of om Sales Tax Act, inasmuch as the sales were not sales at retail "in this
srtaJte'"."

It would seem, therefore, that the reverse would be true
and perhaps this case should be authority fO!r the contention of plaintiff in tJhe instant case.

4.

The most 'recent case covering the subject is handed
down by the U. 8. Supreme Court entitled Scripto, Inc. vs.
Carson. The case is as yet unreported as of this date but
can be :fiound in CCH publication "State Tax Review".
FACTS:
Scripto was doing business in Florida by commission
merchant orrl.y and did not own, lease, or maintain any
of:fiice or other busdrness property in Florida nor did it have
any regular employee or agent there. OTdeTs for its products were solicited by advertising specialty brokers. Florida has a sales tax law similar to ours which states in effect
that the tax on sales is collectible from "dealers" and is to
be added to the purchase price. The question was whether,
in light of the appellants operation, Florida could collect

the tax.
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HELD:

The, court in 1hls case said that Scripto had to collect
and pay the tax even though its agent worked for several

principals.
It is 0/Ur position that there is absolutely no evidence
introduced by the State that this was a sale made outside
of the State of Utah for use within the State of Utah. If
that is the circumstance the state has nort carried their bmden and we, of oourse., have introduced evidence to the contrary showing .that it was a domestic sale within the state
of Utah, for which the .retailer incurs the obligation. We
call the Couvt's attention to the invoices (T~payer's Em.
5 and 6) which are marked f.o.b. Price, Utah, as evidence
in harmony wifth the th~ee cases cited a;b01ve.

POINT 3
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION AUDITORS
ERRED IN ASSESSING SALES OR USE TAX ON PROPERTY PURCHASED OUT OF STATE FOR USE OUT OF
STATE, SAID ITEMS BEING EXEMPT. (Schedule A,
Appendix)
In respect to the items shown on Schedule A of Ex-

hibit 1, we have testified that these items were purchased
for use out of the state. Clearly they are not taxable for
there has been no showing whatsoever that these items
were stored in the state of Utah, or used in the state of
Utah, or sold in the state of Utah. The only thing that has
been done in respect to the items shown on Schedule A is
that the State Tax Commission has concluded ·that the fact
that they were purchased outside the state of Utah means
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that they were used in the state of Utah. This is a conclusion without supporting facts which strikes us as unfuir,
unjust and ·contrary to our coosrtitutional rights which say
that we shall not be deprived of property without due process of law. Merely because there are invoices does not
prove that the use was within the state of Utah. The invoices themselves prove n01thing in respect to this that gives
rise to the belief that a 1Jax is owing. It is incumbent upon
the state to rebut the testimony oif the appellant that all
of this merchandise and equipment shown on Schedule A

was used outside oif the state of Utah. Smce they have
Of.fered no mridence to .the contrary, the evidence submitted
by rthe appellant is persuasive and conclusive. The State
Tax COmmission shouid be required 1Jo decide matters of
such importance upon eiVidence rather than conjecture or
opini,on and unless it has concrete evidence that these items
were used in the state of Utah, it bas no basis upon which
to impose a tax. It isn't incumbent upon the taxpayer to
do more than testify in ,respect to where these items went
and unless refuted clearly the testlimnny stands and is persuasive and binding upoo the Commission.
POINT 4
THE UTAH STATE TAX COiVilVIISSION AUDITORS
ERRED IN ASSESSING SALES OR USE TAX ON PROPERTY PURCHASED OUT OF STATE, INTENDED.F<Th.
USE IN THE STATE, NOT USED IN THE STATE: J3tjT
LATER SOLD OUT OF STATE IN ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES, SAID SALES BEING EXEMPI'.
(Schedule C, Appendix)
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The items shown on Schedule C are self~lanatory.
These items were purchased for use in the state of Utah
but were resold out of state. It is our contention that these
matters are exempt as isolated and occasional sales. Appellant cites as authority for its position in this respect the case
of Geneva Steel Company vs. The State of U1JaJh, 209 P.2d
208. The court in that case used the following language,
which should be appropriate and binding in this case:

"Isolated or oooas:iJonal sales made by pe~sons not regularly engaged in business are not subject to :the tax.
Under this rule no sale is taxaJble if it is not made in
the regular course of a business of person selling mngi!ble personal property. The worn ''business'' as thus
used refers to an ente~~prise, engaged in selling tangible
personal property notwithstanding the fact that the
sales may be few or infrequent."
This appears to oover us expl~oitly. The appellant is
not regularly engaged in the business of selling tangible
personal property. These sales can only be cornstrued as
isolated or occasional sales, and, therefore, exempt by the
express provisions of this statute. The court :further stated
the following, which is in poiTIIt:

"The above regulations, as well as those of other states
which we have examined, definitely contemplate an
isolated or occasional sale as one made by a person
While not in the pursuit of the regular corurse orf his
business of selling tangible pers01nal propervty. We
think thls is a proper and fair' mterpretarti.on. ''
The appellant is without controversy a contractor. It
is not his business to sell personal property and he does nort
sell personal property. He has not filed a sales tax return
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1lor he is not in the business of selling taxable persooal property as a regular course af his business. Ally sales that
are made from his business are o!f an iso~ated and occasional
nature and are expressly exempt and intended to be exempt
by the Utah State Legislature. It seems to us to be a gross
injustice to assess a tax on property of this nature.
POINT·5
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN
ASSESSING PENALTIES AND INTEREST IN ANY
EVENT ~OR THERE IS NO PRIMARY OBLIGATION
ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO PAY THE
ALLEGED USE TAX AND NO SHOWING OF WILFULLNESS IN NOT PAYING, OR KNOWLEDGE ON
PART OF .APPELLANT THAT TAX WAS DUE.

In respect to all of the taxes mscussed. 1above the appellant feels that to assess a penalty and interest is grossly
unfair, unju:srt and punitive without eause. The responsibility to eol1eot the :taxes in any case where there has been
sales is upon fue ret:ailer, not the oonsumer. The responsibility to coUect use tax is primarily upon the retailer and
not the user. Only in the event th.at the retailer does not
pay the use tax is the user responsible. Utah Oode Annotated 59-16-6 smtes:
"Every retailer making sales of :tangible peTSOnal property fior storage, use or other consumption in this starte,
not exempted under the provisions of section 59-16-4
hereof, shall be responsible for tile collection of the
tax imposed by this act from tile purcha.sm-. The retailer may, if he sees fit, collect the tax from the purchaser, but in m event shall he collect as tax an amount
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(without regard to fractional parts of one cent) in excess of the tax computed at the va:te prescribed by this
act.
The tax herein required to be collected by the retailer
shall constitute a debt owed by the retaileE to this
state."
(Emphasi·s added)

The appellant calls special attention to the provisiorn
that the law above cited says that tlhe tax herein required
to be collected by the retailer shall constitute a debt owed
by the ·:retJailer to the state. The important words are "required to be collected." It would appear from the statute
that ·the primary obligation ~or the collection of use tax
beloil1gs to the retailer. Not until the purchaser has discovered that the retailer has not paid it does he become
obligated. If he is obligated he is only obligated under that
section of 59-16-2(j) which says:
"(j). "Ta~payer" shall include every retailer, as herein defined, and every person srtJoring, using or consuming tangi!ble personal property, the storage, use or consumption of which is subject to the 1Jax imposed by
this act when such rtax was not paid to a retailer.''

It would seem, therefore, that !if there is liability, it is
of a secondary nature and if it is of a secondary nature

it cannot come into being until the consumer or us& has
learned of the failure of the retailer to pay the tax. We,
of course, did not learn of this until the delinquent tax assessment was levied. Under those circumstances the fault
is not ours, but the retailers' and the State of Utah. Under
those circumstances no penalty should be affixed because
there is no maliice, fraud, or failure on the part o[ the tax-
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payer and, oonsequently, only the amount of the tax found
to be owing should be assessed, less interest and penalty.
The appellant calls to the attention of the Court the
special definitions of "retailer'' ~and "taxpayer" in the use
tax definitions, Utah Code Annotated 59-16-2, and also the
requiremen~ that all retailers register with the Tax Oommisstoo under Utah Code Annotated 59-16-5, which seems
to imply that the obligation is primarily on the retailer,
and if there is a liability on the user, it is only of a secondary nature and cannot come into being until he is notified of the defauit of the :retailer.

Tax statutes are to be construed. ~most favorably in
favor of the taxpayer and most strictly against the government:
"where the intent or ~meaning of tax statutes or statutes levying taxes, is doubtful, they are, unless a contracy legislative intention appears, to be construed
most strongly against the government and in favor
of the taxpayer or citizen. Any doubts as to theiT
meaning are to be resolved against the taxing authOirity and in favorr of the taxpayer, or as it is sometimes
put, the pe,rson upon whom it is sought to impose the
burden.''
51 Am. Jur. 316, P. 367-68
The above rule is soundly arrived at and is endorsed
by 1Jhe Utah Supreme Court.

"Taxation statutes are strictly construed against the
state and in favorr of the taxpayer * * * *."
W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission,
90 U. 359, 61 P2d 629, 107 ALR 621 (1934)
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CONCLUSION

The taxpayer admits that the audit discloses some purchases UJpOl1 which taxes probably should have been paid
(Schedule C). These items are relatively small in amount
,and 'there was no intent to defraud the state.
The other taxes assessed by the Commission are unjust
and improperly made. Petitioner's objection and petition to
quash the levy should be granted ex:cept as to the amount
he admits he owes tax on. (See Taxpayer's Schedule C).
In any event, no penalty or interest should be assessed in
lighrt of the good faith and innocent mistake of the taxpayer in this regard.
Respectfully submitted,
Jackson B. Howard, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDIX

SCHEDULE 'A'

Summary of material purchased for use out of State and which was used out of State. Page references are
to the schedules made by Tax Commission. This material is believed to be tax exempt.

Page Period
2
8/30/54

lnv. No.

Vendor
Materials
Where Used
Amount
Denver Terra Cotta Company Terra Cotta
Ely, Nevada
$1,126.48
Denver, Colorado
2
9/10/54
SF29130
A. C. Horn Co.
Cement Coloring
Ely, Nevada
93.25
San Francisco, Cal.
2
9/10/54
SF29292
A. C. Horn Co.
Cement Coloring
Ely, Nevada
48.50
San Francisco, Cal.
*2
5/3/54
1240-Ashton Hatch, Inc.
Lumber
Ely, Nevada
1,396.12
Portland, Ore.
9/30/54
6349
Mackintosh & Truman
Lumber
Ely, Nevada
2,270.74
2
Seattle, Wash.
2
8/4/54
2824
Metpar Steel Prod.
Toilet Part. and
Ely, Nevada
900.00
Long Island City, N.Y.
Doors
2
1/13/54
6074
Clipper Mfg. Co.,
Blades
Ely, Nevada
3.00
Kansas City, Mo.
2
1/13/54
7793
Clipper Mfg. Co.
Blades
Ely, Nevada
91.44
Kansas City, Mo.
12/20/55
2776
Gotham Chalkboard
Display Cabinets
Ely, Nevada
970.00
3
New Rochelle, N. Y.
& Chalk Board
3
12/14/55
F2208
Loxit Systems, Inc.
Floor Channels
Ely, Nevada
887.50
Chicago, Ill.
11/10/55
896
Water Seals, Inc.
1500 ft. Waterstop
Gerlock, Nevada 1,725.00
3
Chicago, Ill.
3
12/10/55
6859
Winco Ventilator
Ventilator
Ely, Nevada
32.25
St. Louis, Mo.
Total ............................................................................ --------------------------·------------------------------------------------------------·--------------$9,544.28
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SCHEDULE 'B'
Summary of material purchased for ultimate consumption and, therefore, believed to be exempt to this
Company. Page references are to schedules 3, made by Tax Commission.

Period

Vendor

8/23/52 to 10/22/52

Southam & Sons

Materials
Telephone Poles

Where Used

Amount

Emery_ County

$25,231.03

SCHEDULE 'C'
Materials purchased out of the State for use within the State which are probably taxable. Page references
are to schedule 3 made by Tax Commission.

Inv.No.

Page

Period

3

12/14/55

1

5/26/53

5530

2

7/22/54

SF29130

2

3/18/54

2044

2
2
3

7/22/54
7/22/54
4/11/55

3005
3006
4070

3

4/11/55

3568

4

2/24/56

41163

F2208

Vendor
Loxit System, Inc.
Chicago, Ill.
Tru Line Company
Des Moines, Iowa
A. C. Horn Co.
San Francisco, Cal.
Ross- Martin Co.
Tulsa, Oklahoma
Schuber Sales Co.
Detroit, Mich.
Schieber Sales Co.
Detroit, Mich.
Schieber Sales Co.
Detroit, Mich.
Abbretton Eng. Co.
Houston, Texas

Materials

Where Used

Amount

Floor Channels

Utah

$ 227.15

Coils

Utah

22.00

Cement Coloring, etc.

Utah

73.00

Envelopes

Utah

6.70

In-wall Closet for Tables.
Tables & Benches
6 Porta Fold Tables
4 Benches
6 Pockets for above

Utah
Utah
Utah

2,800.00
2,800.00
1,277.64

Utah

1,149.00

Clear Glass

Utah

55.51

Total................................................................................................................................ - ................................................ $8,411.00
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SCHEDULE 'D'
This is material purchased in Price, Utah, from a representative of Kellogg Switch Board and Supply Company. This transaction was negotiated and consummated in Price, Utah, on the basis of F.O.B. Price, Utah, and
was for ultimate consumption within the State although approximately thirty percent of the 1952 purchases
was used outside of the State. All of the 1953 purchases were used within the State.

Page

Period

*

1952

*

1953

Inv.No.

Vendor

Materials

Where Used

Amount

Kellogg Switch Board & Supply Co.,
Chicago, IlL (All of these bought in
Price and delivered to Price. Deal
consummated at the Mission Motel
and a percentage of these went to
Nevada and Wyoming.)

$49,945.33

Kellogg Switch Board & Supply Co.
(Same as above.)

5,622.03

~

(70% Emery County
(1) (30%1 Pioche, Nevada
and Wyoming)

Total. ...............................................................................................................................................,:·······························$55,567.36
*The taxpayer recollects that several thousand dollars worth of these items were returned and credits
received but do not have the credit memos to substantiate this circumstance.
(1) Resold through Amos Jackson, Architect, Engineer, of Salt Lake City to two of his clients for use in Pioche,
Nevada, and in Sponsored
Wyoming.
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